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NOTE: THE TALENT AGENCIES ACT: A CALL
FOR REFORM.
TOPIC: MARATHON ENTERTAINMENT, INC. V.
BLASI
I.

INTRODUCTION

The policy behind the Talent Agencies Act' (TAA or the Act) is to
protect artists from abuse at the hands of agencies. 2 However, it has been
applied by both the courts and the Labor Commissioner to invalidate entire
personal manager contracts where personal managers procure any
employment for the artist in violation of the Act.3 Essentially, artists have
been allowed to use the TAA as a sword to sever obligations they have
incurred on the road to success. During the summer of 2006, in Marathon
Entertainment,Inc. v. Blasi, a California appellate court held that the trial
court and the Labor Commissioner must first consider whether the illegal
portions of a contract can be severed before voiding an entire agreement.5
This decision was a radical departure from twenty-eight years of
jurisprudence in this field.6 On September 20, 2006, the California
Supreme Court granted review and depublished the opinion.'
This Note will consider the implications of the Marathon decision.

1. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (Deering 2006).
2. See Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 254 (Ct. App. 1995).
3. See generally id. (explaining history and application of the TAA).
4. See Stroman v. New Wave Entm't, TAC 38-05, at 6 (July 11, 2006), available at
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/38-05.pdf; Behr v. Marv Dauer & Assoc., TAC 21-00, at 13
(Aug. 16, 2001), available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/21-00.pdf; Kilcher v. Vainshtein,
TAC 02-99, at 28 (May 30, 2001), available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/02-99.pdf;
Church
v.
Brown,
TAC
52-92,
at
14
(June
2,
1994),
available at
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/52-92.pdf. See also Opening Brief of Respondent at 35-36,
Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Cal. Oct. 30, 2006) (providing an extensive list of
instances in which the Labor Commission has invalidated entire contracts for any violations of
the Act).
5. Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1012 (Ct. App. 2006), petition
for review granted,2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. S145428), depublished by, 49
Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, LEXIS 11453 (Cal., 2006).
6. Dave McNary, Court FavorsManagers, DAILY VARIETY, June 26, 2006, at 14.
7. Marathon, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001.
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Part II will examine the background of relevant law, namely the Talent
Agencies Act and the Doctrine of Severability. Part II will also address
California case law interpreting these two areas. Part III will outline the
facts and procedural history of MarathonEntertainment,Inc. v. Blasi. This
landmark decision is a step in the direction of fairness for managers who
are trying to collect commissions on legally procured employment.
However, even if the Supreme Court of California decides to affirm the
decision, it will not be the end of the controversy over the TAA and the
regulation of personal managers. Part IV will discuss both the possibility
of reversal of the Marathon decision and the reasons why the controversy
will continue regardless. Part V will assert that the California legislature
should create a commission to re-examine the TAA. The Act should then
be amended to include an incidental procurement exception, as well as
criminal penalties for violations that are not incidental to a manager's job
duties. This would allow managers the freedom to promote their clients
without fear of potential contract invalidation, while still providing them
adequate incentive to comply with the Act. The courts and the Labor
Commissioner would be free to apply the Act as it was intended, to protect
artists from potential abuse at the hands of agencies. Finally, Part VI will
conclude that not only would revamping the Act address the issue in this
particular situation, but that such changes are needed to assuage other
controversies in the field of agent/manager regulation.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND: THE TALENT AGENCIES ACT AND
THE DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY

The Talent Agencies Act: CaliforniaLabor Code §§ 1700-1700.47

California began requiring licenses for employment agencies in 1913
when the Legislature passed the Private Employment Agencies Law. 9 This
legislation distinguished theatrical employment agencies from general
employment agencies and provided for additional regulation for theatrical
agents.10 In 1937, the state enacted its Labor Code, 1 and attempted to
further protect the rights of artists in the entertainment industry by

8. See Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 254.
9. Chip Robertson, Don't Bite the Hand that Feeds: A Call for a Return to an Equitable
Talent Agencies Act Standard,20 HASTINGS COMM. ENT. L.J. 223, 228 (1997).
10. Neville L. Johnson & Daniel Webb Lang, The Personal Manager in the California
EntertainmentIndustry, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 375, 383-84 (1979).
11. REP. OF THE CAL. ENT. COMM'N, at 35 (1985).
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incorporating the Artist Managers Law (AML).1 2 Accordingly, the Code
incorporated much of the 1913 legislation, but established "motion picture

agencies" as separate from "theatrical agencies."'

3

In 1943, the Legislature

attempted to extend these protections even further by passing the Artist
Managers Act (AMA). 14 In addition to the general employment agency,
the theatrical agency, and the motion picture agency, the AMA recognized
a new category of agency: the artist manager.' 5 The AMA even codified

some of the "duties now associated with contemporary managers and
agents."'1 6 Specifically, it defined an artist manager as someone "who
engages in the occupation of advising, counseling, or directing artists in the

development or advancement of their professional careers" in addition to
procuring employment or engagements for their clients. 17 Thus, the AMA

reflected a growing and changing entertainment industry, and an attempt to
create regulatory categories "that, in the aggregate, recognized the varying

18
needs of artists within different niche areas" of that industry.
However, the industry was growing rapidly, and the roles of managers

and agents were becoming increasingly separate.1 9 As talent agencies grew
larger, talent agents focused on procuring employment rather than
°
developing careers. 202
As a result, managers stepped in to fill that void.21
Due to these developments, the regulatory categories in the AMA soon
became outdated and unworkable. 22 Case law began to reflect confusion

12. Robertson, supra note 9, at 228; see also Johnson & Lang, supra note 10, at 388-89
(1979) (explaining the use of the term "artists' manager": "The 'talent agent' of the Talent
Agencies Act is the immediate successor to the 'artists' manager.' Under the Artists' Managers
Act, an 'artists' manager' is one who engages in the 'occupation of advising, counseling, or
directing artists in the development or advancement of their professional careers and who
procures, offers, promises or attempts to procureemployment or engagements for an artist.").
13. REP. OF THE CAL. ENT. COMM'N, at 35 (1985).

14. Gary E. Devlin, The Talent Agencies Act: Reconciling the Controversies Surrounding
Lawyers, Managers, andAgents Participatingin California'sEntertainmentIndustry, 28 PEPP. L.
REV. 381,387 (2001).
15. REP. OF THE CAL. ENT. COMM'N, at 36 (1985).

16. Devlin, supra note 14, at 387.
17. REP. OF THE CAL. ENT. COMM'N, at 36 (1985).

18. Devlin, supra note 14, at 387.
19. Id.
20. Id.; see also Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1469-70 (Ct. App. 1999)
(explaining that personal managers "primarily advise, counsel, direct and coordinate the
development of the artist's career. They advise in both business and personal matters, frequently
lend money to young artists, and serve as spokespersons for the artists.").
21. Devlin, supra note 14, at 387; see also Park, 71 Cal. App. 4th at 1469-70 (explaining
that personal managers "primarily advise, counsel, direct and coordinate the development of the
artist's career. They advise in both business and personal matters, frequently lend money to
young artists, and serve as spokespersons for the artists.").
22. Devlin, supra note 14, at 387.
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over "which specific activities and classes of people in the entertainment
industry were regulated under the [AMA]. 23 In 1967, the Legislature
attempted to clarify the law by repealing the motion picture agency and
theatrical agency categories.24

However, the case law continued to reflect

25
the confusion, and in 1978, the Talent Agencies Act was born.
Essentially, the Act "imposes duties and obligations on talent
agencies that represent performing artists. ' 26 The Legislature's stated
intent was to "regulate those individuals whose primary purpose and
function is the procurement of employment for the artist. '27 The Act
defines a talent agency as "a person or corporation who engages in the
occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure
employment or engagements for an artist or artists. '28 It requires all talent
agents to be licensed, 29 to pay licensing fees, 30 to submit all contracts to the
Labor Commissioner for approval,31 to maintain proper records,32 and to
generally "refrain from engaging in... prohibited conduct.33 The Labor
Commission has original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under
the Act, and the Act also guarantees the right to appeal de novo to the
superior court.34
The part of the Act that mandates licensing has become the primary
focus of ongoing controversy: "[n]o person shall engage in or carry on the
occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a license therefore
from the Labor Commissioner., 35 As discussed in the next section, this

23. Robertson, supra note 9, at 230 (summarizing Raden v. Laurie, 120 Cal. App. 2d 778
(Ct. App. 1953), in which the court held that an "unlicensed personal manager's activities in
seeking employment will trigger the licensing requirements of the Act only if the 'contract were
[found to be] a mere sham and subterfuge designed ... to misrepresent and conceal the true
agreement of the parties and to evade the law," but did not establish "whether 'one not licensed as
an artist' manager [may] engage in the procurement of employment,"' and "appeared to provide
for some allowable unlicensed procurement activity, as long as the activity did not result from
contractual 'fraud or pretext').
24. REP. OF THE CAL. ENT. COMM'N, at 36 (1985).
25. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 231-3 (discussing Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 347 (Ct. App. 1967), in which Matthew Katz, personal manager to the band Jefferson
Airplane, had to return commissions for violating the Act).
26. WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 449 at 547 (B.E. Witkin, ed., 10th ed. 2005).
27. Robertson, supra note 9, at 233.
28. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (Deering 2006).
29. Id. § 1700.5.
30. Id. § 1700.12.
31. Id. § 1700.23.
32. Id. § 1700.26.
33. WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 449 at 548 (B.E. Witkin, ed., 10th ed. 2005).
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (Deering 2006).
35. Id. § 1700.5.
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provision has been the focus of much litigation and confusion, and from the
outset, was construed harshly against personal managers.36 In 1982, the
Legislature responded to some of the problems by amending the Act.37
These amendments allow unlicensed persons to negotiate contracts in
conjunction with a licensed agent and to procure recording contracts for
artists. 38 At the same time, the Legislature created the ten-member
California Entertainment Commission 39 (CEC) in order to:
study the laws and practices of this state, the State of New York,
and other entertainment capitals of the United States relating to
the licensing of agents and representatives of artists in the
entertainment industry in general ...so as to enable the
to the Legislature a model bill
commission to recommend
40
licensing.
this
regarding
The Commission concluded that no one, including personal managers,
should be "allowed to procure employment for an artist without being
licensed as a talent agent, except in accordance with the present provisions
of the Act.",4 1 Thus, while the Legislature adopted some changes to the Act
43
in 1986, 42 it decided against an express incidental procurement exception.
.

1. Interpretive Case Law: Waisbren v. PeppercornProductions,Inc.,
Park v. Deftones, and Styne v. Stevens
These three seminal cases can be used to sum up the California
courts' current approach to cases involving regulation of personal managers
under the TAA. In Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc., the court
upheld summary judgment against Waisbren, a personal manager trying to
recoup money he alleged he was owed pursuant to a six-year contract with
The court acknowledged that Waisbren
Peppercorn Productions.44
36. Devlin, supra note 14, at 388-89 (discussing two early disputes, Derek v. Callan, Cal.
Labor Comm'n No. TAC 18-80 (1982) and Pryor v. Franklin, Cal. Labor Comm'n No. TAC 17
MP 114 (1982), in which "personal managers were forced to forfeit their lucrative contractual
relationships with artists due to incidental procurement activities in violation of the TAA.").
37. REP. OF THE CAL. ENT. COMM'N, at 37 (1985).
38. Id. at 39 (1985); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d).
39. REP. OF THE CAL. ENT COMM'N, at 1,39 (1985).
40. Id. at 3 (1985) (within unnumbered footnote); see also Opening Brief for Appellant at
28-9, Marathon v. Blasi, No. S 145428 (Oct. 20, 2006) (noting that the members of the CEC were
the Labor Commissioner, three talent agents, three personal managers, and three artists, "hardly a
level playing field to find fair for the managers").
41. REP. OF THE CAL. ENT. COMM'N, at 6 (1985).
42. Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1472 (Ct. App. 1999).
43. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 258 (Ct. App. 1995).
44. Id. at 250.
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provided many valuable services to Peppercorn, and that his procurement
of employment was merely incidental to those duties.45 However, the court
held that even though managers are not mentioned in the Act, if a manager
incidentally procures or solicits employment, he must comply with the
Act's licensing requirement.46 In doing so, the court looked to the remedial
purpose of the Act, the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of the Act,
legislative history, and prior judicial construction.
With regards to the remedial purpose of the Act, the court noted that it
is "designed to correct abuses that have long been recognized," and to
protect "the personal, professional, and financial welfare of artists" by
strictly regulating talent agency conduct. 4 8 The court emphasized that the
Act should be liberally construed in furtherance of that objective. 49 Next,
the court noted that great weight must be given to "the construction of a
statute by an agency charged with its administration., 50 Hence, the Labor
Commissioner's rejection of an incidental procurement exception is given
deference. 51 The court also considered, in some detail, the legislative
history of the Act, focusing on the 1982 CEC.52 It concluded that the main
reason for the creation of the CEC was to consider whether personal
managers should be able to procure employment for an artist. 53 The court

also deferred to the CEC's conclusion that no one should be able to procure
employment without a license, and determined that that the Legislature had
accepted this by declining to adopt an exception for managers.54
Finally, the court distinguished a recent appellate court decision,
Wachs v. Curry, that had interpreted the Act as requiring a person's
procurement activities to constitute a significant part of his business before
requiring regulation.55 In that case, Arsenio Hall filed a petition with the
45. Id. at 252.
46. Id. at 250.
47. Id. at 254-61.
48. Id. at 254.
49. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 254.
50. Id. at 255.
51. Id. at 254-261.
52. Id. at 256.
53. Id. at 256-57 (explaining that the CEC Report "phrased the first issue to be addressed as
follows: 'Under what conditions or circumstances, if any, should personal managers or anyone
other than a licensed talent agent be allowed to procure employment for an artist without being
licensed as a talent agent?,"' and that "[t]he Report acknowledged that '[t]he principal, and
philosophically the most difficult, issue before the Commission, the discussion of which
consumed a substantial portion of the time of most of the meetings of the Commission was this

first issue."').
54. Id. at 258-59.
55. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 261.
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Labor Commission requesting that Wachs, Hall's personal manager, be
compelled to return all monies collected from Hall due to alleged violations
of the Act. 56 Wachs responded by filing suit in state court against the
Labor Commissioner and others in charge of enforcing the Act, challenging
the Act's constitutionality. 7 The Wachs court held that the Act was
facially constitutional,58 but also concluded that:
from the Act's obvious purpose to protect artists seeking
employment and from its legislative history, the "occupation" of
procuring employment was intended to be determined according
to a standard that measures the significance of the agent's
employment procurement function compared to the agent's
counseling function taken as a whole. If the agent's employment
procurement function constitutes a significant part of the agent's
business as a whole then he or she is subject to the licensing
requirement of the Act even if, with respect to a particular client,
procurement of employment was only an incidental part of the
agent's overall duties. On the other hand, if counseling and
directing the clients' careers constitutes the significant part of
the agent's business then he or she is not subject to the licensing
requirement of the Act, even if, with respect to a particular
client, counseling and directing the client's career was only an
incidental part of the agent's overall duties. What constitutes a
"significant part" .ofthe agent's business is an element of degree
we need not decide in this case. 59
The Waisbren court dismissed this idea as dicta, and thus sounded the
death knell for any "significant part," or incidental procurement
exception. 60 The Waisbren court also regarded the fact that the Wachs
court did not consider the remedial purpose of the Act, the Labor
Commissioner's interpretation of the Act, or the legislative history of the
Act, to be error.6 1 In conclusion, the court noted that it simply refused to
believe that the Legislature intended to exempt personal managers from the
Act "unless his procurement efforts cross some nebulous threshold from
Such a standard is so vague as to be
'incidental' to 'principal.'
62
The Labor Commission officially adopted the Waisbren
unworkable.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Wachs v. Curry, 13 Cal. App. 4th 616, 620 (Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 628.
Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 261 (Ct. App. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 255.
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standard, as that decision comported with its own long-standing
63
interpretation that there can be no exception for incidental procurement.
In Park v. Deftones, the California appellate court solidified its
Waisbren stance and continued the trend of construing the TAA harshly
against personal managers. 64
The Deftones court granted summary
judgment to the defendant band on the grounds that the band's contract
with its long-time manager, Dave Park, was void due to violations of the
TAA.65 It is important to note that Park never received nor requested
compensation for the engagements that were booked in violation of the
Act.6 6 In the course of his duties, Park had booked quite a few shows for
the band.6 7 However, it was only after procuring a recording contract for
the band, for which there is an exception in the TAA,6 8 that the Deftones
sought to have the Labor Commissioner void the agreement. 69 The court
held that incidental activity in procuring employment is subject to
regulation under the Act, even if no commission is collected for the
services.7 °
The Styne v. Stevens decision delineated just how far the Labor
Commissioner's jurisdiction extends in these cases. Styne, a personal
manager, sought payment on commissions he alleged were due under an
oral contract with Connie Stevens.71 Stevens' defense was that Styne had
violated the Act and the contract was thus void.72 The trial court denied
summary judgment on these grounds, "reasoning that Styne's activities on
Stevens's behalf were not of a kind governed by the Act."' 73 The court then
refused her "request for a jury instruction presenting her Act-based
defense. 7 4 The jury initially returned a verdict for Styne.75 However, the
trial court granted Stevens' request for a new trial, finding that it had erred
in refusing her request for a jury instruction about the requirements of the

63. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 224-25 (explaining that the California Labor
Commission opted to enforce the Waisbren standard over Wachs v. Curry).
64. See generally Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465 (Ct. App. 1999).
65. Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1467-68 (Ct. App. 1999).
66. See id. at 1468.

67. Id.
68. CAL.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (Deering 2006).
Park, 71 Cal. App. 4th at 1468.
Id. at 1472.
Styne v. Stevens, 26 Cal. 4th 42, 48 (2001).
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.

75. Id.
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Act.76 Reflecting the case law confusion that has accompanied the Act in

all its incarnations, the verdict was then reinstated by the appellate court,
which found that her Act-based defense was barred because she had not
invoked it within one year of being served with Styne's complaint."
Finally, the California Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
confusion. 78 The final verdict was that the Labor Commissioner has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters arising under the Act,
that "reference of disputes involving the [A]ct to the commissioner is
mandatory," and that "all remedies before the Commissioner must be
exhausted before the parties can proceed to the superior court., 79 The court
also held that the one-year statute of limitations does not bar use of the Act
as a defense. 80 Even if asserted as a defense with no claim for affirmative
relief, the superior court proceedings
must be stayed and a petition must be
8
filed before the commissioner. 1
Together, the aforementioned case law provides a framework of rules
within which the courts operate to regulate personal managers under the
TAA. First, the Styne decision makes it clear that the Labor Commissioner
has original jurisdiction over all controversies under the Act.82 This means
that, although a petitioner is guaranteed review by the superior court, all
issues related to the act must first be heard by the Commissioner, even if
said issues arise only as a defense in a Superior Court action. Ultimately,
this means that the Labor Commission will, in reality, apply any standard
adopted by the court and continue its tendency towards total contract
invalidation.83 Second, the Waisbren decision dictates that there is no
76. Id.
77. Styne, 26 Cal. 4th at 47.
78. See generally id.
79. Id. at 54 (quoting REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin, 69 Cal. App. 4th 489, 49495 (1999) (italics in original)).
80. Id. at 51.
81. Id. at 56-59.
82. Id. at 56.
83. See Stroman v. New Wave Entm't, TAC 38-05 (July 11, 2005), available at
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/38-05.pdf; Behr v. Mary Dauer & Assoc., TAC 21-00 (Aug. 16,
2001), availableat http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/21 -00.pdf, Kilcher v. Vainshtein, TAC 02-99
(May 30, 2001), available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/02-99.pdf.; Church v. Brown, TAC
52-92, at 14 (June 2, 1994), available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/52-92.pdf. See also
Opening Brief of Respondent at 35-36, Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Oct. 30,
2006) (providing an extensive list of instances in which the Labor Commission has invalidated
entire contracts for any violations of the Act). Contra Cuomo v. Atlas Entm't, TAC 21-01,
available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/21-01.pdf (holding that the manager in question
should not have to disgorge any amounts prior to the date of the violation); Anderson v. D'Avola,
TAC 63-93, availableat http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/63-93.pdf (voiding only one out of four
contracts in contention); Opening Brief for Appellant at 13-18, Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi,
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incidental procurement exception for personal managers.84 This decision
also highlights the extreme judicial deference to legislative history and to
the Labor Commissioner's decisions. 85 However, the court's dismissal of
the Wachs reasoning showcases the difficulties the courts have had in
applying the Act.86 Finally, the Deftones decision delineates the extent to
which the Waisbren standard will be applied: a contract can be invalidated
for violations of the Act even if no payment was requested or received for
the violations.87
B. The Doctrine of Severability
The Restatement Second of Contracts avoids ever using the term
"severability," for fear of "wrongly suggesting that an agreement itself can
be

characterized

as

. .

. 'severable'

for

all

purposes

and

in

any

circumstances.' 8 8 However, it provides a straightforward definition of the
doctrine in § 183: if the parties' performances can be apportioned "into
corresponding pairs of part performances" so that the parts of each pair are
properly regarded as equivalents and one pair is not offensive to public
policy, that portion of the agreement is enforceable by a party who did not
engage in serious misconduct.8 9
To apply this definition to a simple set of facts, imagine a situation in
which a personal manager has procured a recording contract for his client,
as allowed by the TAA. Imagine though, that the personal manager has
also violated the TAA by booking a single performance engagement for the
artist. In very simple terms, this means that if violating the TAA is not
considered "serious misconduct,"-(and of course, this is the real issue
here to be discussed later)-then those corresponding pairs of part
performance that do not violate the TAA are enforceable. 90 An example of
an enforceable pair of part performance would be the artist's agreement to
pay the manager a commission in exchange for procurement of a record
contract.
However, there is no easy formula or bright line rule to determine

No. S 145428 (Cal. Oct. 20, 2006) (providing examples and summaries of instances in which the
Labor Commission has incorporated severance into its decisions).
84. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., Inc., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 259 (Ct. App. 1995).
85. Id. at 254-61.
86. Id. at 261.
87. Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1472 (Ct. App. 1999).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 183 (1981).

89. Id.
90. Id.

2007]

THE TALENT A GENCIES A CT. A CALL FOR REFORM

which contracts may be severable. 9' The most important factor, though, is
the intent of the parties. 92 Intent is determined by the "terms and provisions
of the contract," the subject matter of the contract, and "the circumstances
of the particular transaction. 93 If the intent of the parties is not clear, the
courts will generally look to the interdependence of the parts of the contract
and the nature of the consideration.9 4 If the parts of the contract are not so
"interdependent or interwoven that the parties must be deemed to have
contracted only with a view to the performance of both, and would not
have entered into one without the other," then the contract will be
severable. 95 Put another way, a contract can be severable if the illegal term
is not an essential part of the agreement and if the parties would have
entered into the agreement even without the offending, illegal term.96
Likewise, if the consideration for the parts is "divisible and separable so as
to be capable of apportionment" without harming the contract or creating
the need for a new contract, the agreement will also be severable.9 7 When
possible, severing illegal provisions so that a contract can be enforced
comports "with
the law's overriding policy in favor of enforcing
98
agreements."
California codified the doctrine of severability into its Civil Code in
1872, summarizing it even more succinctly than the Restatements: "Where
a contract has several distinct objects, of which one at least is lawful, and
one at least is unlawful, in whole or in part, the contract is void as to the
latter and valid as to the rest." 99 Of course, as applied it is not quite so
simple, necessitating an examination of the case law interpreting the code.
1. Interpretive Case Law
The doctrine is well-entrenched in the California courts' decisions
and supports the general principle that in contracts, both law and equity
disfavor forfeiture.100 Marathon Entertainment,Inc. v. Blasi sums up many
of the fundamental principles the court
follows when
applying the

91. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 406 (2006).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statute ofFrauds § 436 (2006).
95. Id.
96. Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REv. 41, 47-48
(1995).
97. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statute ofFrauds § 436 (2006).
98. Movsesian, supra note 96, at 47.
99. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1599 (Deering 2006).
100. People v. Far West Ins. Co., 93 Cal. App. 4th 791, 795 (Ct. App. 2001).
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First and foremost, "[t]he overarching consideration in
doctrine.' 0
determining whether to allow a severance of an agreement is whether the
interests of justice would be furthered by severing the agreement."'' 0 2 To
determine this:
[t]he courts must consider the main objective of the parties'
agreement. If the illegality is collateral to and severable from the
main purpose of the contract, then severance is appropriate. If,
however, the taint of illegality so permeates the entire agreement
that it cannot be removed by severance or restriction but only by
reformation or augmentation, the courts must invalidate the
entire agreement. 103
Finally, courts are more likely to grant a severance if separating the
legal and illegal parts of the agreement would "conserve a contractual
relationship [without] condoning an illegal scheme", and "prevent parties
from gaining undeserved benefit or suffering undeserved detriment as a
result of voiding the entire agreement-particularly when there has been
full or partial performance of the contract."' 0 4 The California courts have
in violation of public policy may be severed
even held that contracts made
105
so.
do
to
if it is appropriate
III. MARATHON ENTERTAINMENT, INC. V. BLASI
A.

The Facts and ProceduralHistory

In December 1998, Marathon Entertainment and Rosa Blasi entered

101. Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1010-11 (Ct. App. 2006),
petition for review granted,2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. S 145428) (citation
omitted). See generally WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 330 at 363-65 (B.E. Witkin,
ed., 10th ed. 2006) (using many of the same cases to explain the severability of unconscionable
provisions).
102. Marathon, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 1010 (citing Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th
1064, 1074 (Cal. 2003) (holding that an unconscionable arbitration clause could be severed
because it was the only illegal provision in the agreement and could be removed without
changing the nature of the contract as a whole)).
103. Id. (citing Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 659 (Ct. App.
2004) (holding that a cost-sharing provision of an arbitration agreement was not severable)).
104. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 123-24 (2000)
(holding that an arbitration agreement could not be severed where a lack of mutuality permeated
the agreement and was thus tainted with illegality).
105. Whorton v. Dillingham, 202 Cal. App. 3d 447, 453 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the
possibility of severance existed where the agreement rested partially on illegal consideration (a
sexual relationship), and partially on legal consideration (chauffeur, bodyguard, secretarial and
real estate counseling services)).
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into an oral contract.10 6 Marathon was to serve as Blasi's personal
management, and Blasi was to pay Marathon a fifteen percent commission
on all entertainment employment income. 10 7 Blasi failed to pay Marathon
the commission from her employment contract with the television series
"Strong Medicine" (Blasi allegedly reduced Marathon's commission
percentage to ten percent and then stopped payment altogether).' 0 8 In the
fall of 2001, she terminated the oral contract and told Marathon that her
talent agent would now act as her personal manager.10 9 Blasi was
represented by a licensed talent agent at all times during the term of the
Marathon contract. 10
Marathon filed an "action against Blasi for breach of oral contract,
quantum meruit, false promise and unfair business practices" in February
of 2003.111 Blasi obtained a stay from the court, and then initiated a Labor
Commission proceeding alleging that Marathon had "been performing
unlawful activities as unlicensed talent agents by seeking and attempting to
procure, or procuring employment... without being licensed to do so and
in violation of the Talent Agencies Act." ' 1 2 The Commissioner invalidated
the entire contract1 as
illegal for unlicensed talent agency services in
13
violation of the Act.
Marathon appealed the Labor Commissioner's decision to the
Superior Court for a de novo trial. 1 4 Blasi then moved for summary
judgment, which the court1 1granted,
affirming the Labor Commissioner's
5
invalidation of the contract.
On appeal from this decision, the court looked to the doctrine 1of16
severability as codified in Section 1599 of the California Civil Code.
The court found as follows:
The fact that a personal manager must comply with the Act's
licensing requirements before engaging in the regulated
activities of a talent agency does not necessarily mean, however,
106. Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1006 (Ct. App. 2006), petition
for review granted,2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20,2006) (No. S145428).
107. Id. at 1005.
108. Id. at 1006.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1005.
111. Id. at 1006.
112. Opening Brief for Appellant at 14, Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Oct.
20, 2006).
113. Marathon, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 1007.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1007-08.
116. Id. at 1010.
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that a contract for personal manager services must be completely
invalidated if the personal
manager commits even a single
117
violation of the Act.
Blasi argued that if the court held that personal managers who violate
the Act are allowed to collect compensation from lawfully procured
employment, it would "destroy the managers' incentive to comply with the
Act."' 1 8 The court addressed a brief paragraph to this issue, finding that
barring recovery on illegal contracts is "ample financial incentive to
comply with the Act."'11 9 Finally, because the court found that there were
triable issues of material fact as20 to the severability of the contract, it
1
reversed the trial court's decision.
B. Case Law Cited by the CaliforniaAppellate Court in Marathon
In reversing the Superior Court's decision, the court reviewed a
wealth of cases interpreting the doctrine of severability, many of which are
addressed in Part II of this Note. 121 In particular, the court directed its
focus to those cases involving violations of business licensing statutes. The
court found that the fact pattern in Birbrower v. Superior Court could be
likened to the Marathon/Blasi situation, and that the decision in Birbrower
supported Marathon's position.122 In Birbrower, a New York law firm
provided services to a California client both in California (in violation of
Section 6125 of the California Business and Professions Code), and in New
York.1 23 The California Supreme Court held that the firm may be able to
collect its New York fees under the doctrine of severability, as long as the
illegal portions of the agreement (those relating to the practice of law in
California) could be separated from the legal ones (those relating to
practice in New York). 124 Thus, the court reversed the appellate court's
decision to void the entire attorney fee agreement and invalidated only the
part of the fee agreement relating to the services provided in violation of

117. Id. at 1008.
118. Id. at 1012.
119. Marathon, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 1012.

120. Id. at 1009.
121. See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064, 1074-75 (2003); Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 123-24 (2000); Abramson v. Juniper
Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 659 (2004); Whorton v. Dillingham, 202 Cal. App. 3d
447,452-53 (1988).
122. Marathon, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 1005.
123. Birbrower v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 119, 126 (1998).
124. Id. at 140.
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the California statute.125
The Marathon court also stressed that "[b]oth equity and law disfavor
forfeiture" and cited several other cases in support of the proposition that
contracts made in violation of a business licensing statute are not
automatically unenforceable. 26 For example in 1957, the California
Supreme Court held in Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons "that in
determining whether to enforce a contract made in violation of a business
licensing statute, courts must consider whether 'the forfeiture resulting
from unenforceability is disproportionately harsh considering the nature of
the illegality."",127 Perhaps most prescient to cases involving actors
attempting to escape from personal manager contracts, in 1946 the
California Supreme Court warned in Gatti v. Highland Park Builders that
"courts must be wary of transforming a protective licensing scheme
intended for the public safety into 'an unwarranted shield for the avoidance
of a just obligation.' '1 28 Reaching even further back into its history of
interpreting contracts made in violation of licensing statutes, the court also
cited Wood v. Krepps.129 In that case, the California Supreme Court
enforced a promissory note despite the plaintiffs violation of a licensing
statute. 30 The court there held that the licensing statute did not expressly
prohibit enforcement of contracts made in violation of the statute:
The ordinance does not declare that a contract made by any one
in the conduct of the various businesses for which licenses are
provided to be procured under the ordinances, shall, if a license
is not obtained, be invalid; nor is there any provision therein
indicating in the slightest that this failure was intended to affect
in any degree the right of contract. 131
The Marathon court also looked to Johnson v. Mattox, in which a
California appellate court upheld the severance of an unlicensed
contractor's construction contract made in violation of the California
Business and Professions Code, which specifically prohibited the
enforcement of construction contracts of unlicensed contractors.132 The
court allowed the contractor to recover for goods which were not related to
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
(1914)).
132.

Id.
Marathon, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 1009.
Id. (quoting Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons 48 Cal. 2d 141, 151 (1957)).
Id. (quoting Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, 27 Cal. 2d 687, 690 (1946)).
Id. at 1010.
See generally Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382 (1914).
Marathon, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 1010 (quoting Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 387
Johnson v. Mattox, 257 Cal. App. 2d 714, 719 (Ct. App. 1968).
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133
the illegal construction activities.
Finally, the Marathon court explained that while Waisbren v.
PeppercornProductions, one of the seminal cases on personal managers
and the TAA, could be taken as inconsistent with the holding in Marathon,
it actually carries no weight with regard to severability. 134 The court made
it clear that while some, including perhaps the Labor Commissioner,
believe that Waisbren completely precludes severance of personal manager
135
contracts if there is a single violation of the Act, this is incorrect.
Waisbren never discussed ' severability,
and is thus "not authority for
136
propositions not considered."

IV. ANALYSIS
In some circumstances, actors use the Talent Agencies Act as a sword
to sever obligations they have incurred on their way to success. A classic
example of this is Park v. Deftones, in which a band avoided paying
commission to their manager for a legally procured recording contract
1 37
because the manager booked gigs for them without compensation.
Although booking these shows was a relatively serious violation of the Act,
it seems intuitively unfair that the band could use these violations to get out
of their obligations. It was only when Park filed suit to collect his
commission that objections
were made to Park's efforts, citing them in
138
violation of the Act.
The Marathon case is a similar example of an artist attempting to
avoid paying commission due on an obligation (a contract for the "Strong
139
Medicine" television series) that was not incurred in violation of the Act.
Indeed, after firing Marathon at the end of "Strong Medicine's" second
season, Blasi reaffirmed her intent to pay Marathon all monies owed to
Marathon for its work with her on the series, then never paid the company
another dollar. 140 When Marathon sued "to get paid for its labors," Blasi
responded by petitioning the Labor Commission to invalidate the
133. Id.
134. Marathon, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 1013.
135. Id. at 1012-13.
136. Id. at 1013 (quoting People v. Alvarez, 27 Cal. 4th 1161, 1161 (2002)).
137. Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1467-68 (Ct. App. 1999).
138. See Edwin McPherson, The Talent Agencies Act IsAlive, but Is It Well?, 22 L.A. LAW.,
Dec. 1999, at 55.
139. See generally, Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001 (Ct. App. 2006),
petitionfor review granted,2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. S145428).
140. Opening Brief for Appellant at 14, Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Cal.
Oct. 20, 2006).
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contract.1 41 On January 30, 2004, the Labor Commission did just that,
finding that Marathon
had repeatedly procured employment for Blasi in
1 42
violation of the Act.

The Act was meant to protect artists from abuses at the hands of
agencies and unlicensed agents. It was not created to allow artists to
receive gratis services from managers who undertook to develop their
careers when, in many cases, the artists did not make enough money for
any agent to consider representing them.1 43 The Marathon decision was
thus a commendable move by the court to uphold the spirit of the TAA.
However, while the Marathon decision was a step in the right direction, it
is certainly not the end of this controversy. The decision faces strong
opposition from powerful Hollywood forces.1 44 Furthermore, it can be
distinguished on its facts from much of the case law relied upon, and thus
may not stand up to California Supreme Court review.
A. Hollywood Opposition to the Decision
The Screen Actor's Guild (SAG), the American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA), the Association of Talent Agents
(ATA), the Director's Guild of America (DGA), and Robert Jones,
California's Labor Commissioner, are all vocal opponents of the
decision. 45 These Hollywood players actively sought the depublication of
the Marathon ruling before the California Supreme Court granted appeal
by writing separate letters to Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald
George. 146 Now that review has been granted, and the decision has indeed
been depublished, these powerful groups 1continue
to assert their influence,
47
most recently as amici in support of Blasi.
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id. at 15.
143. See Devlin, supra note 14, at 386 ("The personal manager is often the artist's first
representative because agents typically will not accommodate unknown talent or talent that is less
in demand; managers are the only individuals in the business that are actually willing to procure
employment for such artists."). See also McPherson, supra note 138, at 60 ("[I]t is not the artists
but the agents who are being protected. In fact, in this case, the act is protecting the very agents
who refused to represent the Deftones when Park was booking their performances because the
band was not getting paid enough money to generate enough commissions for those agents.").
144. See Dave McNary, Commissioner Backs Blasi, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 29, 2006, at 6.
See also Leslie Simmons, Industry Groups Choosing Sides Carefully in Blasi Commission Case,
THE HOLLYWOOD REP., ESQ., Sept. 18, 2006,

http//www.hollywoodreporteresq.com/thres/search/article-display.jsp?vnu-Content-id=10031238
69.
145. See McNary, supra note 144, at 6. See also Simmons, supra note 144.
146. Simmons, supra note 144.
147. See generally Brief for the Screen Actors Guild, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
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The Labor Commissioner himself is perhaps the most vehement
opponent. In his letter to the Supreme Court, he voiced his disagreement
and urged the Court to take heed that the ruling would seriously complicate
the task of the Labor Commission:
It is anticipated that if the decision in Marathon Entertainment
remains published and controlling, the Talent Agent
Controversies hearings will be more complicated and time
consuming in that the issues surrounding the severability of the
contract will have to be addressed and the determination of
whether the illegal procurement activity tainted the entire
contract before us. The other anticipated result is that the ability
of the Act to regulate unlicensed talent agents will be greatly
eroded. 148
If the Marathon decision stands, it is not clear how the Commission
will apply it to future controversies. While the Labor Commissioner would
be forced to consider whether the doctrine of severability is applicable,
there can be no assurance that it will be applied fairly. Here, the
Commissioner has expressed his displeasure at how "complicated" and
"time-consuming" it will be if he and his staff have to consider issues of
severability. 149 Certainly such worries do not outweigh the overriding
concerns of a fair and equitable result, or the fact that the doctrine of
severability has been entrenched in California law since 1872.150
Moreover, the doctrine of severability allows for an out. If the
Commissioner feels that the "taint of illegality so permeates the entire
agreement that it cannot be removed by severance,"' 151 he may still
invalidate the entire agreement. 52 The Commissioner makes his feelings
on severability clear through his letter to the California Supreme Court.
Respondents at 1-2, Marathon Entre't, Inc. v. Blasi, No. S 145428 (Cal. Jan. 2007).
148. See McNary, supra note 144, at 6
149. Id. See also Brief for the Screen Actors Guild,. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 22, Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Jan. 26, 2007) (arguing that
applying the doctrine of severability to the Talent Agencies Act creates "a nebulous standard that
is unworkable."); Opening Brief for Respondent at 6, Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, No.
S145428 (Oct. 30, 2006) (arguing that applying the doctrine of severability on a case-by-case
basis is "cumbersome.").
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1599 (Deering 2006).

151. Marathon Entm't, Inc. v Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1010 (Ct. App. 2006),petition
for review granted,2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. S145428) (citing Abramson v.
Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 659 (Ct. App. 2004)).
152. See Opening Brief of Respondent at 7, Marathon Entr't, Inc. v. Blasi, No. S145428
(Cal. Oct. 30, 2006) (calling the Court of Appeals' new standard of applying the doctrine of
severability "standardless," and asking, "What is the 'taint' of 'illegality' and when does it
'permeate'?").
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Given the Labor Commission's history of construing the Act harshly
against personal managers, it seems likely that the Commissioner would
have little difficulty deciding that any procurement activity in violation of
the Act taints the entire contract so as to make it un-severable. The Labor
Commission has always had the authority to award a manager "some
amount of compensation based on quantum meruit," but in most cases has
declined to do so, preferring instead to invalidate the entire contract and
divest the violator of both past and future earnings. 153 In addition, the
Commission has often been accused of being strongly biased towards
agents. 154 It is likely that the Commissioner would thus continue to side
with these artists and agents. There are no guarantees that forcing him to
consider the severability of a contract will stop artists from rescinding
personal manager contracts, except perhaps in cases where the procurement
was so slight as to blatantly invalidate any argument that the entire contract
is tainted.
The National Conference of Personal Managers (NCOPM), a trade
association of personal managers, recently took these very same concerns
to Governor Schwarzenegger. 155 In a letter to the Governor, they alleged
that the letter the Labor Commissioner wrote to the California Supreme
Court was not only "biased" and "improper", but "illegal." 156 This is
because Jones will still be involved in making decisions about the case if it
is ultimately remanded to the Labor Commission. NCOPM noted that
"[t]he California Government Code requires state agencies to act within
constitutionally mandated limits in administering law and mandates a
separation
between
administration
and
adjudication.... The
commissioner's comments in his letter. .. were not made in an advisory
position, but as an advocate in a case still before him."'1 57 Neither Jones nor
Schwarzenegger were available for comment, so any effect the NCOPM
153. Devlin, supra note 14, at 392. See also Stroman v. New Wave Entm't, TAC 38-05, at
6 (July 11, 2006), available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/38-05.pdf; Behr v. Marv Dauer &
Assoc., TAC 21-00, at 13 (Aug. 16, 2001), available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/2100.pdf; Kilcher v. Vainshtein, TAC 02-99, at 28 (May 30, 2001), available at
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/02-99.pdf.; Church v. Brown, TAC 52-92, at 14 (June 2, 1994),
available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/52-92.pdf.; Opening Brief of Respondent at 35-36,
Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Cal. Oct. 30, 2006) (providing an extensive list of
instances in which the Labor Commission has invalidated entire contracts for any violations of
the Act).
154. Kelli Shope, The Final Cut: How SAG's FailedNegotiations with Talent Agents Left
the ContractualRights of Rank-and-File Actors on the Cutting Room Floor, 26 J. NAALJ 123
(2006); see also McPherson, supra note 138, at 60.
155. Dave McNary, Managers Go to Gov in Dispute, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 9, 2007, at 4.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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158
letter may have remains to be seen.

B. The Possibilityof Reversal
Perhaps even more important than the Commissioner's opposition,
and other entertainment industry forces, is the very real chance that the
California Supreme Court will not agree with the analysis and overrule the
decision. First of all, the cases cited by the court can be distinguished from
Marathon. Moreover, the appellate court only gave perfunctory treatment
to the reasoning behind one of its recent decisions, Yoo v; Robi, 15 9 and to
the possibility of the Marathon decision undermining the TAA itself. 60 It
is almost certain that the Supreme Court will look more closely at these
issues.
1. Distinguishing the Cases Cited by the Marathon Court
The facts in Birbrower can easily be distinguished from Marathon. In
Birbrower, the statute in question provided that "[n]o one may recover
compensation for services as an attorney at law in this state unless [the
person] was at the time the services were performed a member of The State
Bar.' 6' The court then went into a detailed discussion about what it meant
to practice law "in this state."'' 62 It applied the statute to Birbrower's
activities in California, and determined that the firm did indeed practice
law "in this state," and had thus violated the statute. 63 However, the court
went on to say that the statute cannot regulate the practice of law in other
states, and that Birbrower may be able to receive compensation for its work
in New York to the extent that it is possible to "sever the portions of the
consideration attributable" to services rendered in New York. 164 Thus, the
court applied the doctrine of severability because the scope of165the
California statute did not reach the events that took place in New York.
The events in Marathon took place entirely within the state of
California and were governed by the California Labor Code. Birbrower

158. Id.
159. Yoo v. Robi, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1089 (Ct. App. 2005).
160. See Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1012-13 (Ct. App.2006),
petitionfor review granted,2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. S145428).
161. Birbrower v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 119, 127 (1998) (emphasis added).
162. Idat 128-30.
163. Id. at 131.
164. Id. at 139-40.
165. Id. at 124 ("[W]e do not believe the Legislature intended section 6125 to apply to those
services an out-of-state firm renders in its home state.").
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presented a set of facts where all activities performed in California were
illegal, and thus void, but all of Birbrower's activities that were performed
outside of California were beyond the reach of California law.
Contrastingly, Marathon presents a set of facts where all activities took
place in California, some legal and some potentially in violation of the
statute. Thus, it was much easier to separate the legal acts from the illegal
ones in Birbrower. More importantly, Birbrower did not present the
complicated policy issues that Marathon does. In twenty-nine years of
jurisprudence under the TAA, the courts and the Labor Commissioner have
declined to apply the doctrine of severability to similar fact patterns.1 66 For
the court to make so radical a change in its approach to construing these
contracts would require more than a comparison to Birbrower, with its very
different set of facts. It would require an in-depth analysis of whether such
a change in construction is in the interests of public policy, an analysis
which the appellate court simply did not perform.
Furthermore, the other cases the court relied on to show that
violations of business codes do not always mean a contract must be
invalidated, can also be distinguished in an important way. All of the codes
discussed in those cases were drafted very differently from the TAA. 167 All
had criminal penalties (misdemeanors) for a violation. 168 Thus applying the
doctrine of severability in those cases (for contractors, attorneys, etc.) does
not lessen violators' incentive to comply with the statutes. Essentially, the
defendants in those cases do not need the threat of total contract
invalidation for violations because they already face the threat of criminal
sanctions.
Notably, the Marathon court did not address the issue of deterrence in
its decision. 169 Yet the Waisbren court did, noting that the CEC considered
this very issue, and recommended that the legislature not re-enact criminal
penalties because the "most effective weapon for assuring compliance with
the Act is the power ...to ...declare any contract entered into between

166. See Yoo v. Robi, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1089, 1103-04 (Ct. App. 2005).
167. See Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 147 (1957); Gatti v Highland
Park Builders, 27 Cal. 2d 687, 688-89 (1946); Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 389 (1914);
Johnson v. Mattox, 257 Cal. App. 2d 714, 717-18 (Ct. App. 1968) (citing to Bus. & Prof. Code
§§ 7026-7059 as the applicable statutes (it is Bus. & Prof. Code § 7030 that provides a violation
is a misdemeanor)); Birbrower v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 119, 127 (1998).
168. See Lewis & Queen, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 147; Gatti, 27 Cal. 2d 687, 688-89; Wood, 168
Cal. 382, 389; Johnson, 257 Cal. App. 2d 714, 717-18 (citing to Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 70267059 as the applicable statutes (it is Bus. & Prof. Code § 7030 that provides a violation is a
misdemeanor)); Birbrower, 17 Cal. 4th 119, 127.
169. Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1013 (Ct. App. 2006), petition
for review granted, 2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. S145428).
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the parties void from the inception. 17 ° In essence, the California
legislature deliberately passed over criminal sanctions, and instead chose
the threat of total contract invalidation as the sole method to deter
violations of the TAA. 17 1 This means that applying the doctrine of
severability to contracts in violation of the Act leaves violators with little to
fear. 172 Arguably, many of the activities a manager performs that are in
violation of the Act are not activities for which a manager expects payment.
Rather, such activities are often in furtherance of the artist's career, and
thus in anticipation of future commissions on other contracts. Consider
again the Deftones example, where the band's manager booked
performance engagements for the band. 73 The manager did not do so to
receive a commission on the shows the band played. 74 Park asserted that
he did so to increase the band's popularity in order to get them a recording
contract, a contract on which he should have received a commission.1 75 If
the only penalty for violation is that a manager will not get paid for his
illegal procurement activities, activities he does not expect to be paid for
anyway, what is left to deter him from violating the Act? As long as the
manager ensures that the illegal acts remain distinct and severable, there is
no threat of criminal sanction or contract invalidation for crossing the line
from incidentally procuring employment to acting as an unlicensed agent.
2.

What about Yoo?

Just as the Waisbren court dismissed as dicta the reasoning with
which it did not agree in Wachs, so the Marathon court dismissed as dicta
its reasoning in Yoo v. Robi. 176 In the February 2005 decision, a California
170. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod. 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 262 (Ct. App. 1995). See also
REP. OF THE CAL. ENTM'T COMM'N, at 8, 15-18 (1986) (explaining that criminal sanctions had
been removed from the Act in 1982, and considering whether to recommend reinstatement). See
also Brief for the Screen Actors Guild, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6,
Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) ("One of the primary, and
empirically most effective, enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Talent
Agencies Act has been the administrative and judicial invalidation of contracts, in their entirety,
based on the procurement of employment by unlicensed individuals in violation of the Talent
Agencies Act. The possibility of losing all commissions, including those earned for services that
do not fall within the Act's regulatory scheme, is a tremendous disincentive to violating the
Act.").
171. See CAL. LAn. CODE § 1700.4 (Deering 2006).
172. See Brief for the Screen Actors Guild, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 6-7, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S 145428 (Cal. Jan. 26, 2007).
173. Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1468 (Ct. App. 1999).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1470.
176. Marathon Entm't, Inc. v. Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1013 n.9 (Ct. App. 2006),
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appellate court discussed severability and personal manager contracts for
the first time. 177 But the Marathon court addressed Yoo, the only case to
previously discuss severability with regard to manager contracts, only in a
footnote, stating that:
[a]lthough Yoo broadly stated that "the public policy underlying
the Act is best effectuated by denying all recovery, even for
activities which did not require a talent agency license", that
statement is dicta because the trial court in Yoo had found that
the main purpose of the agreement was illegal and the appellate
court concluded, for factual reasons, that it was inappropriate to
sever the agreement ...Given that the doctrine of severance
requires that each case be evaluated on its own merits, the mere
was denied in Yoo does not dictate the
fact that severance 178
outcome of this case.

The fact pattern in Yoo v. Robi should be somewhat familiar by now,
as it echoes the previously discussed cases. Howard Wolf managed Paul
Robi, a recording artist with the Platters for a period of years (Yoo was a
successor in interest). 79 Wolf violated the Act numerous times by
procuring employment for Robi.180 Following Robi's death, his widow
licensed two albums using recordings Robi made with the Platters.'

81

Wolf

filed suit, alleging that he was due a ten percent commission on the albums
under the contract. 182 Ultimately, the court stayed the action and the Labor
Commissioner voided the contract for violations of the TAA.183 On appeal,
Wolf argued that the trial court should have applied the doctrine of
severability to sever his illegal activities and allow him to receive his
commission on his legal activities, i.e. the two albums in question.' 84 The
court flatly rejected this argument, relying on stare decisis and policy
concerns. 185 The court noted that denial of compensation to managers for
incidental procurement has been unanimous in case history. 1 86 Moreover,
the court asserted that the policy behind the Act is to deter managers from
engaging in illegal activity, and even posited that "one reason the
petitionfor review granted,2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. S145428).
177. Yoo v. Robi, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1089,1089 (Ct. App. 2005).
178. Marathon, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1013 n.9.
179. Yoo, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1089, 1094.
180. Id. at 1105.
181. Id. at 1095.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1102-03.
185. Yoo, 126 Cal. App. 4th at 1103-04.
186. Id. at 1104.
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Legislature did not enact criminal penalties for violation of the Act was
'because the most effective weapon for assuring compliance with the Act is
the power ...to declare
any contract entered into between the parties void
187
from the inception."

The Marathon court correctly noted that the statements regarding the
doctrine of severability in Yoo are dicta. While the court seemed to say that
public policy precludes application of the doctrine of severability, the
actual holding of Yoo is simply that the trial court correctly entered
judgment for Robi. However, the court did soften its stance on severability
after the rather draconian statements about the deterrent power of possible
total contract invalidation.1 88 The court concluded that while California
Civil Code section 1599 may "authorize[] a court to sever the illegal object
of a contract from the legal it does not require the court to do so," and that
"[t]he decision whether to sever the illegal term of a contract is informed
by equitable considerations."1 89 Thus, the Yoo decision does not entirely
preclude application of the doctrine of severability, even though the court
was diametrically opposed to applying it on policy grounds. The appellate
court simply agreed with the trial court that in the Robi-Wolf situation the
dilution of the deterrent effect on the Act is more serious or outweighs the
inherent unfairness of Robi receiving an unbargained for benefit. 190 But the
very fact that the Marathon court chose to ignore the reasoning behind this
recent decision could be an issue on appeal, as it is likely that the Supreme
Court will consider the policy issue discussed in Yoo.
3.

Policy: Will the Act be Undermined?

It is this very issue, the incentive (or lack thereof) to comply with the
Act, which the Marathon appellate court glossed over. While the court
deemed it important enough to devote an entire section of its decision to"The Availability of Severance Will Not Undermine the Act" 19 1-it
included no analysis at all. The court simply stated "[w]e believe that
permitting the possible recovery of commissions on lawfully procured
employment contracts but barring such recovery on illegally procured
employment contracts will provide personal managers with ample financial

187. Id. (quoting Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 262 (Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting from the 1985 CEC report)).
188. Id. at 1105.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Marathon Entm't v Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1012 (Ct. App. 2006), petition for
review granted,2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. S 145428).
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incentive to comply with the Act."' 92 As mentioned above, the legislature
clearly disagreed with this statement, preferring to rely on the threat of total
contract invalidation rather than criminal penalties. 193 As also discussed
previously, the illegally procured employment contracts are not necessarily
ones on which the manager expected to be paid at all. 194 Why, when policy
issues come up in these cases again and again, would the appellate court
give this issue such cursory treatment?
Perhaps the court reasoned that giving people an incentive to comply
with the Act is a problem better left to the California legislature. Blasi's
attorneys allege that the court was simply substituting "its own notion of
how best to prevent violations of the TAA ...for the clear and rational
reasoning of the Legislature."1' 95 But as the court provided no analysis, it is
impossible to determine its reasoning. Will the Supreme Court give these
issues the same cursory treatment? Probably not. When the Marathon
appellate court carefully reviewed the application of the doctrine of
severability in prior case law, the most prevalent issue was one of
fairness-are the interests of justice served by applying the doctrine? The
Marathoncourt may have committed a serious error in not applying this to
the facts at hand. It should have considered in detail whether applying the
doctrine would serve the interests of justice, or, as the Labor Commissioner
believes, undermine the Act. Certainly the Supreme Court will want to
address this issue. Indeed, both Marathon and Blasi devote 196
considerable
time to the issue of policy in their briefs filed before the Court.
In summary, the Marathon decision has a strong chance of being
overruled by the California Supreme Court. It is distinguishable from most
of the cases relied on by the appellate court, and does not address important
policy issues. If it is overruled, personal managers are left in the same
quandary of having contracts nullified because of minor violations of a
licensing statute in which they are never even mentioned. 197 But, even if
192. Id.
193. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., Inc., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 262 (Ct. App. 1995).
Contra Answer Brief for Appellant at 26-33, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S145428 (arguing
that there is no support for the contention that it was the legislature's clear intent to rely on total
contract invalidation to deter violations of the TAA).
194. See supra p. 452.
195. Opening Brief for Respondent at 26, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S 145428 (Cal. Oct.
30, 2006).
196. See Answer Brief for Appellant at 33-35, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S145428;
Opening Brief for Respondent at 29-34, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Cal. Oct. 30,
2006).
197. See Brief for the National Conference of Personal Managers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 4-6, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S 145428 (Cal. Jan. 2007); Opening
Brief for Appellant at 17-33, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Cal. Oct. 20, 2006) (both

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

456

[Vol. 27:431

the decision is not overruled, personal managers may still find their
contracts being voided. After all, the agency with original jurisdiction in
all of these cases is headed by a man who is vehemently opposed to the
decision.198 As such, how will that agency apply the doctrine of
severability? Even though the Labor Commission will be forced to
consider the doctrine, no one can dictate exactly how it must be applied.
How many and what type of violations will be considered severable? How
many violations will be allowed before the Labor Commission considers
the entire contract to be tainted with illegality and thus prone to complete
invalidation? 199 Even if the law is settled, the interpretation will still be up
in the air. It is an accepted principle of law that deference should be given
to the agency in charge of administering a statute.200 However, surely this
does not mean that the legislature would wish that agency to create the
standard entirely. Thus, a workable standard is needed.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
It has been twenty-five years since the California Legislature last
reviewed the TAA. In 1982, it seemed that the call for reform was being
answered when the "Legislature created the CEC to study the laws of
California and other states relating to the licensing of agents ... in the
entertainment industry in order to recommend.. . a model bill regarding
licensing."2 0 ' Indeed, when the Legislature amended the Act in 1986, they
followed the recommendations of the CEC.2 °2 And yet the controversies in
the area of agent and manager regulation have persisted, and even grown,
as evidenced by the sheer volume of academic discourse on the subject.
Moreover, this discourse is not limited to the issue of whether
managers should be able to procure employment. Two other major issues,
also in dire need of legislative attention, have dominated the public debate
on agents and managers. The first is the controversy surrounding the fact
that managers, unlike agents, have been able to act as producers. 20 3 Agents,
arguing that because the legislature chose not to mention personal manager in the Act, they
should be exempt from all regulation under the TAA).
198. See McNary, supra note 144, at 6. See also Simmons, supra note 144.
199. See Opening Brief for Respondent at 7-8, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S145428
(Cal. Oct. 30, 2006) (calling the court of appeals new standard of applying the doctrine of
severability "standardless," and asking, "[w]hat is the 'taint' of illegality and when does it
'permeate'?").
200.
201.
202.
203.

Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod. Inc., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 255-56 (Ct. App. 1995).
Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1472 (Ct. App. 1999).
Id.
See generally William A. Birdthistle, A Contested Ascendancy: Problems with
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because they have been subject to guild regulations, are prohibited from
owning any "equity interest in a guild member," which essentially
20 4
"translates into a bar against agents producing the work of their clients."
Managers, however, are not subject to guild regulation and so they may act
as producers, which can result in major conflicts of interest.20 5 For
instance, how can a manager foster the artist's needs if, as a producer, that
manager is concerned with "limiting the outlays of production"? 20 6 This
has even prompted some to advocate manager regulation rather than
revisions to the TAA.2 °7
The second issue is the failure of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and
the Association of Talent Agents (ATA) to negotiate a revised collective
bargaining agreement. 20 8 This issue is actually a result of the producer
controversy discussed above. Due to agents' dissatisfaction with the ban
on owning equity interest in their clients under the old collective bargaining
agreement, known as Rule 16(g), the ATA sat down with SAG in 1999 to
negotiate a revised agreement. 09 These negotiations fell apart in 2002.210
As a result, Rule 16(g) expired, neither organization has returned to the
bargaining table, and agents are now regulated by a general services
agreement (GSA) drafted by the ATA and approved by the Labor
Commissioner.2 11 Some feel that the GSA combined with the TAA is not
protective enough of2 12actors, and that the TAA should be reviewed and
expanded as a result.
In light of the fact that the confusion in the field of agent and manager
regulation extends far beyond whether or not managers should be able to
incidentally procure employment for their clients, it is time for the
California legislature to take another look at the TAA. Specifically, the Act
should be amended to reflect the rest of the body of California case law

PersonalManagersActing as Producers, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 493, 495-501 (2000) (providing a
brief history of manager/agent regulation, an overview of the issues that arise when managers act
as producers, and suggestions for reform in the form of guild regulation of managers).
204. Id. at 521.
205. Id. at 535-36 n.323.
206. Id. at 535.
207. See id. at 543-45 (2000) (detailing Assemblywoman Keuhl's proposal regarding
manager licensing); see also Heath B. Zarin, The California Controversy Over Procuring
Employment: A Casefor the PersonalManagersAct, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 927, 931-33 (1997).
208. See generally Shope, supra note 155 (discussing the failed SAG-ATA negotiations).
209. Shope, supra note 155, at 132-33.
210. Id. at 124.
211. Id. at 124,132-39.
212. Id. at 153-54.
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regarding contracts made in violation of licensing statutes.2 13 That is, the
legislature should re-introduce criminal penalties for violations, and enact
an incidental procurement exception. This would allow managers the
freedom to procure employment when it is incidental to the rest of their
duties and beneficial to their clients, while still providing them with
adequate incentives to comply with the Act.
Opponents to re-introducing criminal penalties for violations of the
Act point to the fact that the CEC warned against reinstatement in 1982,
and that the legislature heeded this warning in 1986.214 However, the
reasoning behind the CEC's recommendation was that criminal penalties
were constitutionally questionable in light of the ambiguity inherent in the
Act.215 Specifically, the CEC found that the phrase "procure employment"
was vague and unclear. 2 16 But if the legislature reviews the Act and creates
a meaningful definition of what it means to procure employment these
constitutional concerns become moot. One way to create a meaningful
definition would be to define which types of procurement activities are
necessary and incidental to the work of a personal manager.
Of course, detractors of an incidental procurement exception have
also generally argued that any such an exception would be vague, 217
perhaps unconstitutionally so. As mentioned above, the Waisbren court
refused to accept that the legislature meant to exempt personal managers
from regulation unless "procurement efforts cross some nebulous threshold
from 'incidental' to 'principal.'

21 8

But the court went on to explain that it

could not accept this because there was no rational basis provided by the
Act for the court to do so.2 19 Without direction from the legislature, the
court is not in a position to decide when procurement is no longer
incidental. 220 Therefore, while the court refused to read an exemption into
the Act, it does not necessarily follow that the legislature could not create a

213. See generally Lewis and Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 147 (1957); Gatti v
Highland Park Builders, 27 Cal. 2d 687, 689 (1946); Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 389 (1914);
Johnson v. Mattox, 257 Cal. App. 2d 714, 717 (Ct. App. 1968) (citing to Bus. & Prof Code
§§ 7026-7059 as the applicable statutes (it is Bus. & Prof. Code § 7030 that provides a violation
is a misdemeanor)); and Birbrower v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 119, 127 (1998) (all of which
provide for criminal sanctions tempered by adequate exceptions).
214. Brief for the National Conference of Personal Managers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellants at 2, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S 145428 (Cal. Jan. 2007).
215. REP. OF THE CAL. ENTM'T COMM'N, at 15-16 (1985).
216. Id. at 16 (1985).
217. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., Inc., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 255 (Ct. App. 1995).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 262.
220. Id.
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workable exemption. Even members of the Labor Commission itself have
expressed a desire for reform. 22 1 David Gurley, Labor Commission
attorney, noted in at least two cases, his displeasure with the draconian
application of the Act: "Until case law or the legislature redirects the
Labor Commissioner in carrying out our enforcement responsibilities of the
Act, we are obligated to follow this path. 22 2
Potential drafters would do well to look at New York's equivalent to
the Act, and subsequent case law, in this area. The New York statute takes
a common sense approach to the realities of a manager's duties:
"Theatrical employment agency" means any person.., who
procures or attempts to procure employment or engagements for
circus, vaudeville, the variety field, the legitimate theater,
motion pictures, radio, television, phonograph recordings,
transcriptions, opera, concert, ballet, modeling or other
entertainments or exhibitions or performances, but such term
does not include the business of managing such entertainments,
exhibitions or performances, or the artists or attractions
only incidentally
constituting the same, where such business
22 3
therefor.
employment
of
seeking
the
involves
And while California courts have lamented the difficulty of applying
an incidental procurement exception,224 the New York courts have
experienced little difficulty applying such an exception. 225 Notably, the
New York statute also includes criminal penalties for violations.226
However, the California legislature may need to go one step further
than the New York statute. After all, California has a history of case law
confusion in this area. Moreover, there are likely to be concerns about
221. Opening Brief for Appellant at 12, Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, No. S145428 (Cal. Oct.
20, 2006).
222. Id.
223. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171 (Consol. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Zarin, supra
note 207, at 965-66 (explaining that "[t]he incidental booking exception applies only to
representatives who function primarily as personal managers for their artist-clients").
224. See generally Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., Inc., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (Ct. App.
1995).
225. See Zarin, supra note 207, at 966-69 (discussing Mandel v. Liebman, 100 N.E.2d 149
(N.Y. 195 1), in which the court stated "that the issue of whether an unlicensed personal manager
violated New York's licensing requirements was a question of fact for the jury," and also
discussing Friedkin v. Harry Walker, 395 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Civ. Ct. 1977), in which the court
declared the exception did not apply where the defendant was not acting as the plaintiff's personal
manager, thus demonstrating "the criteria that must be satisfied in order for the incidental booking
exception to apply to an individual," and providing, in footnote 247, a list of six other New York
cases applying the exception).
226. See id. at 967.
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enacting a constitutionally vague statute which does not provide potential
violators with enough direction to know what type of procurement is
incidental and when they have crossed the line into acting as an unlicensed
agent. 227 One course of action would be to create a non-exclusive,
illustrative list of examples of situations in which it is acceptable for a
manager to procure employment for his client. For example, personal
managers of musical acts might be able to book performance engagements
for their artists, but only in small venues, and only if they neither request
nor receive commissions on those engagements. By creating exceptions
like this one, artists are given more opportunities to succeed in their fieldprotection of the artist is the ultimate goal of the TAA-and managers are
given set guidelines for how to foster their clients' careers without crossing
the line into acting as unlicensed talent agents.228
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a very good chance the Marathon decision will be overturned
by the California Supreme Court. Much of the case law relied upon by the
appellate court can be distinguished by the differences between the
business licensing statutes in those cases and the Talent Agencies Act.
Moreover, the appellate court glossed over the Yoo precedent and the
serious policy concerns inherent in applying the doctrine of severability to
contracts that are made in violation of the TAA. 22 9 Even if the California
Supreme Court allows the decision to stand, there is no guarantee that the
Labor Commissioner will apply the doctrine fairly.
And so the
controversies in the field of agent and manager regulation continue.
Attorneys and academics have been calling for reform for years.23 ° In
1979, attorneys Neville Johnson and Daniel Webb Lang noted that "[f]or
over twenty-five years, the personal manager operating in the California
entertainment industry has been in the throes of a controversy, the specific
issues of the dispute being whether and when personal managers need a
227. See, e.g., Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 255.
228. Contra REP. OF THE CAL. ENTM'T COMM'N, at 10-11 (1985) (considering and
rejecting exceptions to the Act, for example allowing "the personal manager to engage in 'casual
conversations' concerning the suitability of an artist for a role or part," or allowing the artist to
"call a personal manager into the negotiations of an employment contract").
229. Marathon Entm't v. Blasi, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1013 n.9 (Ct. App. 2006), petition
for review granted, 2006 LEXIS 11453 (Cal. Sept. 20, 2006) (No. S145428).
230. See eg., Shope, supra note 155; James O'Brien, Regulation of Attorneys Under
California'sTalent Agencies Act: A TautologicalApproach to ProtectingArtists, 80 CAL. L.
REv. 471, 509 (1992) (calling for an incidental procurement exception for attorneys); McPherson,
supra note 138, at 60 (calling for a new commission to review the Act in the wake of the

intuitively unfair Deftones decision).
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California state license to procure employment for professional
entertainers., 23 1 Change the "twenty-five" to "fifty," and this statement
still rings true. It is time again for review, and for meaningful change.

Tracie Parry-Bowers*

231. Johnson & Lang, supra note 10, at 375.
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